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LSE	Continental	Breakfast	7:	the	business
consequences	of	a	breakdown	in	exit	negotiations
The	seventh	Continental	Breakfast	seminar	at	the	LSE,	held	under	Chatham
House	rules,	focused	on	the	potential	implications	that	a	breakdown	of	the	Brexit
negotiations	would	have	for	UK	businesses.	The	overall	message	was	that	the
consequences	of	such	a	breakdown	–	a	“no	deal”	outcome	–	would	be	severe.
Angelos	Angelou	(LSE)	reports	on	the	discussion.
A	“no	deal”	outcome	would	be	an	economic	disaster	for	most	UK	businesses.
This	is	primarily	because	almost	90%	of	total	British	exports	would	be	affected	by
tariffs,	costing	a	total	of	£40bn.	The	imposition	of	tariffs	would	also	have	spillover
effects	for	other	sectors,	like	the	food	and	drink	industry,	which	the	CBI
estimated	would	suffer	20%	in	extra	costs.	Meanwhile,	UK	businesses	would	be
exposed	to	increased	exchange	rate	risks	(the	effect	of	unexpected	exchange
rate	variations	on	a	firm’s	value).
In	the	aftermath	of	the	vote,	the	pound	dropped	more	than	10%	against	the	US	dollar	and	continued	to	decline	until	it
reached	its	lowest	level	against	the	dollar	for	30	years,	at	$1.30	to	£1.	In	the	event	of	no	deal,	uncertainty	over	the
economic	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	might	lead	the	pound	to	a	new	low.	This	would	entail	losses	for
multinational	firms	based	in	the	UK,	since	they	are	more	exposed	to	exchange	rate	volatility,	as	well	as	risks	for	UK
firms	with	international	operations.	While	a	further	fall	in	the	pound	might	offset	some	of	the	new	tariffs	they	will	be
facing,	their	production	costs	might	also	rise	given	the	higher	import	cost	of	raw	materials	and	the	falling	value	of
British	wages	to	foreign	workers.
The	site	of	the	future	Crossrail	station	at	Canary	Wharf,	London.	Photo:	Nick	Moulds	via	a	CC-
BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
Moreover,	in	the	event	of	no	deal,	British	consumers	would	see	their	purchasing	power	eroded	due	to	import	tariffs.
The	imposition	of	non-tariff	barriers	(like	“rules	of	origin”	regulations),	as	well	as	tariff-related	costs,	would	end	up
costing	three	times	more	than	previously.	Non-tariff	barriers	would	make	British	businesses	less	competitive,	since
they	would	deprive	them	of	the	ability	to	conduct	prompt	and	low-cost	transactions	with	the	rest	of	the	EU.	All	in	all,
UK	per	capita	income	could	fall	by	6.3%-9.5%.
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For	businesses	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	Northern	Ireland,	the	impact	would	be	even	more	acute.	They	have
hitherto	operated	on	the	assumption	that	cross-border	transactions	can	be	conducted	promptly	and	with	minimal	cost
inside	the	European	Single	Market,	without	a	hard	border.	The	dynamics	of	the	peace	agreement	may	change	since
the	economic	interdependence	of	the	two	sides	would	decline.	This	has	led	some	to	argue	for	the	closest	possible
alignment	between	UK	and	EU	standards.
The	status	of	EU	workers	in	British	firms	would	also	be	uncertain.	The	rights	of	EU	citizens	employed	in	Britain	are
not	guaranteed	if	the	EU	and	the	UK	fail	to	reach	a	final	deal.	Skilled	labour	could	leave	as	a	result.	EU	migrants	are
generally	younger	and	more	educated	compared	to	UK	employees	and	tend	to	raise	capital	productivity	via
knowledge	spillovers	and	higher	human	capital	stock.
Financial	services
Under	‘no	deal’,	all	financial	service	providers	will	lose	their	passporting	rights	(the	ability	of	a	firm	that	has	been
licensed	by	one	EU	member	state	to	provide	cross-border	services	to	other	EU	member-states	without	getting
additional	authorisation	from	the	local	regulators).	Since	they	would	not	be	in	the	Single	Market,	UK	financial
firms	would	not	be	allowed	to	conduct	financial	operations	there.	Passporting	has	allowed	many	of	the	world’s
leading	financial	institutions	to	operate	in	the	EU	with	low	bureaucratic	and	economic	costs.	The	UK	has	attracted
the	largest	number	of	headquarter-based	investments	in	the	EU.	Facing	‘third-country’	rules	usually	means	partial
access	to	the	single	market,	while	the	type	of	access	is	almost	unilaterally	decided	by	the	Commission	and	can
be	ended	or	changed	at	any	time.
‘Third	country’	status	would	put	around	50%	of	the	UK’s	EU-related	economic	activity	(with	a	total	worth	of	£20bn),
35,000	jobs,	and	around	£3-5bn	in	tax	revenues	under	threat.	The	downgrade	would	probably	leave	the	UK	outside
all	EU	decision-making	centres,	meaning	it	will	lose	any	source	of	political	or	technical	leverage	over	issues	of
financial	governance	and	regulation.	The	EU,	and	especially	the	European	Parliament,	appears	to	be	unreceptive	to
the	idea	of	a	bespoke	deal	vis-à-vis	financial	regulation:	indeed,	the	relevant	EU	authorities	(ESAs	and	ESMA)	that
are	responsible	for	the	regulation	of	the	financial	markets	are	powering	up	in	order	to	cope	with	the	challenges	that
will	arise	if	the	UK	falls	under	the	status	of	a	third	country.	Moreover,	a	number	of	other	European	financial	centres
like	Amsterdam,	Dublin,	Frankfurt,	Paris	and	Madrid	have	positioned	themselves	as	the	next	centres	for	passporting-
based	activities.	The	UK	would	have	to	follow	EU	preferences	for	financial	regulation.	Britain,	along	with	other	EU
countries	with	substantial	international	presence	and	stronger	capital	markets	(like	the	Netherlands)	has	been
advocating	for	a	style	of	EU	governance	that	is	supportive	of	enhanced	market	access,	liberalisation	and	open
market	substitutes	instead	of	intervention.	France,	Spain	and	Italy,	on	the	other	hand,	usually	favour	a	more
interventionist	approach	and	are	supportive	of	further	regulation.
Legal	limbo
A	number	of	international	deals	signed	by	the	EU	on	behalf	of	the	UK	will	stop	covering	British	firms.	Replacing	these
deals,	especially	in	the	field	of	finance,	would	require	much	time	and	effort,	with	a	characteristic	example	being	the
EU-US	international	agreement	on	derivatives	contracts.	Given	that	the	UK	derivative	market	is	the	biggest	one	in
Europe,	no	deal	will	have	immediate	and	substantial	economic	implications.
Investment	and	growth
Investment	uncertainty	has	adverse	implications	for	an	economy’s	productivity.	The	uncertainty	that	followed	the
referendum	result	and	the	current	uncertainty	about	the	state	of	the	negotiations	are	potentially	delaying	investment
and	therefore	also	the	recovery	in	UK	productivity.	Current	investment	dynamics	appear	to	support	this	hypothesis.
While	GDP	has	risen	in	the	UK	over	the	past	few	months,	the	positive	state	of	the	global	economy	would	have
justified	an	even	bigger	increase.	At	the	second	quarter	of	2016	it	was	estimated	that	UK	GDP	rose	faster	than
expected,	amounting	to	0.6,	with	services	and	production	driving	this	trend.	On	the	other	hand,	construction	has
contracted,	while	consumer	confidence	and,	subsequently,	consumer	spending	also	fell	by	0.3%	in	2017.	(Before	the
referendum,	consumer	spending	was	driving	GDP	growth.)
LSE Brexit: LSE Continental Breakfast 7: the business consequences of a breakdown in exit negotiations Page 2 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-04-18
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/04/18/lse-continental-breakfast-7-the-business-consequences-of-a-breakdown-in-exit-negotiations/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Given	the	uncertainty,	most	UK	businesses	have	started	making	contingency	plans.	Around	60%	of	British
companies	already	have	such	plans	in	place,	of	which	10%	have	already	taken	some	practical	steps	(e.g.
moving	people	who	may	be	affected	by	no	deal).	Another	25%	of	these	companies	are	expected	to	take	similar	steps
in	the	near	future.
The	shape	of	a	deal
For	the	UK	business	community,	the	ideal	deal	would	grant	barrier-free	access	to	the	Single	Market.	However,	the
most	realistic	aspiration	is	for	the	UK	to	be	in	a	customs	union	with	the	EU.	A	customs	union	deal	would	not	have	to
cover	all	economic	sectors	(in	the	EU-Turkey	deal,	agricultural	products	are	excepted),	it	would	not	require	the	UK	to
pay	any	fees	to	the	EU	and,	most	importantly,	it	would	not	require	the	UK	government	to	accept	freedom	of
movement.	On	the	other	hand,	Britain	would	have	to	align	its	trade	policy	with	the	EU’s,	without	any	say	in	it.
The	conditions	to	reach	a	positive	deal	are	already	in	place,	since	the	EU	now	has	a	more	centralised	system	of
financial	regulation	–	a	trend	that	will	be	intensified	with	Brexit.	Hence	it	would	be	simpler	for	the	UK	to	conclude	a
single	comprehensive	deal	with	all	EU	member-states.	One	mechanism	to	ensure	the	compatibility	of	the	two
industries	is	through	the	establishment	of	British	subsidiary	companies	in	continental	Europe,	which	would	allow	for	a
system	of	managed	divergence.	This	would	entail	extra	costs,	because	British	companies	would	still	need	to	comply
with	the	corporate	and	market	governance	regulations	of	the	respective	country	and	its	capital	requirements.	Of
course,	such	a	development	would	also	have	negative	implications	for	the	European	financial	market,	since	it	will
lead	to	increased	fragmentation	and	higher	refinancing	costs	for	local	EU	banks.
An	alternative	would	be	a	system	of	equivalence,	which	the	EU	has	granted	to	certain	third	countries.	It	offers	the
possibility	for	non-EU	firms	to	access	the	EU	market	provided	that	the	regulatory	regime	of	their	country	of	origin	is
equivalent	to	the	EU	regime.	This	would	imply	that	the	UK	would	still	need	to	follow	EU	regulations	while	having	no
influence	over	them.	Furthermore,	the	regime	of	equivalence	would	only	partially	cover	the	field	of	financial	services
–	for	example,	it	will	not	apply	to	the	field	of	asset	management,	lending	and	deposit-taking.	It	is	also	important	to
note	that	the	process	of	granting	equivalence	to	a	third	country	is	highly	politicised.	The	European	Commission	can
decide	and	revoke	the	regime	of	equivalence	unilaterally	whenever	it	sees	fit.
Another	solution	would	be	for	Britain	to	remain	in	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	UK-based	firms	would	still	be
able	to	use	passporting,	since	they	would	still	have	unrestrained	access	to	the	Single	Market.	But	it	would	be
necessary	for	the	EEA	and	the	EU	to	agree	on	the	powers	of	the	European	Supervisory	Authorities.	At	the	same	time
the	UK	would	not	be	a	member	of	the	customs	union	–	meaning	that	its	businesses	would	be	subject	to	burdensome
rules	of	origins	regulations	–	and	would	not	have	any	voting	rights	in	the	EU	institutions.	Moreover,	the	UK	would	still
need	to	follow	EU	rules.	Such	an	option	is	politically	less	feasible	since	it	would	require	the	four	freedoms	–	of
movement	of	goods,	services,	labour	and	capital	–	to	remain	in	place.
For	some	politicians,	no	deal	or	a	breakdown	of	talks	still	looks	like	an	appealing	option.	Some	Leavers	would	prefer
it	to	a	failure	to	control	freedom	of	movement.	EU	politicians	would	like	to	avoid	giving	the	UK	access	to	the	single
financial	market,	including	passporting,	without	getting	any	substantial	concessions.	Determined	to	avoid	this,	the	UK
business	and	financial	community	has	formulated	a	careful	campaign	of	public	advocacy	for	their	desired	deal.	This
strategy	is	in	stark	contrast	to	their	pre-referendum	tactic,	where	a	number	of	enterprises	and	business	corporations
joined	the	Remain	campaign	and	produced	evidence-based	justifications	on	why	the	UK	should	stay	in	the	EU.	Since
that	strategy	was	ineffective,	the	business	and	financial	community	chose	a	subtler	approach	in	order	to
avoid	alienating	public	opinion.
Any	final	deal	should	strike	a	fine	balance	between	access	to	the	European	market	and	border	control.	In	that	sense
it	is	bound	to	be	an	agreement	unlike	any	other	that	we	have	seen.	Drawing	conclusions	from	the	agreements
between	the	EU	and	Norway	and	the	EU	and	Canada	therefore	has	limited	analytical	value.	Businesses	in	the	UK
need	a	more	secure	environment,	and	guarantees	that	the	transition	phase	will	be	managed	properly	and	that	a	final
deal	will	be	reached.
This	post	represents	an	account	of	a	discussion	held	at	the	LSE,	and	not	the	views	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	London
School	of	Economics.
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Angelos	Angelou	is	a	PhD	candidate	in	the	European	Institute,	working	on	EU-IMF	cooperation.	He	is	drawing	case
studies	from	the	Eurozone	bailouts	and	examines	the	main	drivers	of	cooperation	and	discord	between	the	IMF,	the
European	Commission	and	the	ECB	during	times	of	crisis.
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